Mostly Inedible
Agamben begins the chapter "Taking Place" in The Coming Community with this idea:
The meaning of ethics becomes clear only when one understands that the good is not, and cannot be, a good thing or possibility beside or above every bad thing or possibility, that the authentic and the true are not real predicates of an object perfectly analogous (even if opposed) to the false and the inauthentic.
Ethics begins only when the good is revealed to consist in nothing other than the grasping of evil and when the authentic and the proper have no other content than the inauthentic and the improper. This is the meaning of the ancient philosophical adage according to which "veritas patefacit se ipsum et falsum." Truth cannot be shown except by showing the false, which is not, according to the etymology of the verb patefacere, which means "to open" and is linked to spatium, truth is revealed only by giving space or giving a place to non-truth--that is, as a taking-place of the false, as an exposure of its own innermost impropriety.
I returned to this because at dinner last night Cullen was arguing an ethical assessment of porn & sexual relations that was based on a linear understanding. If I understood him correctly one can assess the factors of a situation in order to deem something moral or immoral. I'm probably oversimplifying his approach. I'd had a few beers & he makes a good argument. He's a much slier speaker & a much quicker & more aggressive thinker than I am & he quickly set the playing field of the argument with his terms & system. Basically even though I fundamentally disagreed with the way he was discussing ethics I was unable to express it in a way that could engage his terms. Basically I was not born to practice philosophy. Basically he kicked my ass.
ed note: I may have totally misrepresented Cullen's argument here, via either ignorance or misunderstanding or Old Style or a desire to set up an easy straw man. Probably mostly the last. The conversation with him just got me thinking baout things I hadn't thought about in a while, which is a good. Please divorce these ideas from your idea of Cullen, who has a tremendously twisty mustache.
It's the linearity that bothers me, the ability to allow exemplification to represent on more than a linguisistic (or even imagistic level if you want to blur the line between ethics & aesthetics for a moment). When one needs to limit the potential factors to such an extent that ostensibly real-world applicable ideas such as sexual morality can only be proven with archly defined examples that appeal to or eliminate broad generalizations of contributing factors & psychological states then how can these examples be considered exemplary? I guess if I really see things defined by their becoming, their development of desires then I see the morality of sexual interaction as being a developing system of redefinition. A decision derived from set theory may be applicable to one of the decisions made in the process of decisions that lead from an actor in a pornographic movie through printing, processing, designing, packaging, distribution, retail, purchasing, watching & self-gratification (far from an inexhaustive list of factors involving individuals making decisions, ignoring all socio-political aspects), but cannot account for the interplay of ethical relationships. And it's this understanding of relational ethics that seems to allow for an applicable ethics that does not attempt to provide a single moral example to define morality, thereby creating a hierarchy of correctness.
And of course, as with ethics so with aesthetics. They're fraternal twins. Reading mannies for Octopus has made me understand a bit more about relational aesthetics.
posted by Mathias Svalina @ 8:55 AM
10 Comments:
I may not follow everything you've said here, but one thing I'd like to say is that problems seem to occur when decisions are made via some kind of binary, brick&mortar ethical theory, rather than something relational. That an ethical decision made "linearily" cannot always prove to be the best decision (as it sometimes may lead to wrong, inaccurate judgements), seems to lay bare the fact of our world's "relationality" -- the world here being the social world we've created. It makes more sense to me that our theories should mirror our world rather than sit outside of it, guided by the architecture of "what should be".
Reading this over, I'm afraid I've created a circular argument...perhaps I wasn't made for philosophy either, but rainmaking.
Are you saying that the inability to ensure the good result of a decision negates the ability to make an ethical decision?
I ask that b/c it seems to be a problem with systemic notions of ethics, that the individual no longer has what could be considered free will.
And you're an excellent rain maker. John Grisham wrote a delicious novel about you.
at first i was like "no," but now i'm like "oh, shit, yeah that's what i'm saying (in a way)."
isn't every ethical decision's desire a "good" result? and if we can't guarantee (or at least have a fighting chance in attaining) the "good" result, it wasn't a very well made or thought out decision.
i think john grisham thinks he knows quite a bit about ethics.
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I hope to give some clarification with regard to my position (as presented by Mathias) and a quick response to the post by Sommer. First, it is not clear the way I conceive of the good and Agamben’s position on the good differs. All of our evaluative terms are relational; there is no denying that. People differ in thinking the relation is one of supervenience (i.e. if the non-moral facts change, do the moral facts necessarily change?). I do think, however, that the relation is between the non-moral objects and us, whether it is a supervenience relationship or not, I do not know yet (I don’t know what Agamben’s position is as well). We place the value upon non-moral objects using the only tools available to us: language. In short, I’m not sure how this helps either argument. (I might be chasing a red herring here, and this quote may have little to do with argument, but I thought I’d briefly address the quote). This is probably a stage-setting mechanism used nicely by Mathias. I need to read more.
Secondly, I’m not sure what it means to have a linear ethic. What does that mean? It would help to have some explanation. I can only interpret linear and how it might work with ethical understanding with the following definition: all reasons and judgments only have one valence and can be no other way. This may be a simple position, which is why I need help here (I’m almost sure I’m being uncharitable), but if that is what is being attributed to me, I can only say that this is not my view. I can assess the facts of the situation and those facts determine whether something is moral or immoral, but it is unclear to me why this is linear. It seems like there are various ways actions or persons can be moral or immoral (good, bad, rational etc.) It seems that in any given context, the facts can shift, changing the shape of the situation and the way we evaluate it. This seems severely nonlinear at best.
Another way I might take myself as having a linear understanding is isolating certain facts from others. I do not do this. All facts, be they psychological states, objects within context, backwards causality, intention, etc. are all in play and can drive the shape of the situation to change indefinitely.
One problem with my view is I must use examples to set the shape. I admit this might be methodologically suspect, however it is the only tool available when you hold a theory of reasons such as my own. This may make it seem linear in the way I have described, but I think my explanation (albeit sparse) confirm that the system I work with is nonlinear.
I’m not sure if any of this was brought up during our conversation last evening, but I recall some of this being expressed and at least gives some credence to my view. My post has nothing to do with sexuality (I hope that’s okay), but I think this gives a nice supplement to Mathias’ well written post.
Finally, to the Sommer comment. I have many questions that I will not ask here, because I’m not sure what is being expressed. The following quote puzzled me most:
“It makes more sense to me that our theories should mirror our world rather than sit outside of it, guided by the architecture of "what should be". ”
I take this as expressing that our theories should mirror the world that we live in, so the beliefs that we currently hold or have been historically been held in other cultures and societies or systems (which has become my word of the day). I can only answer this [gasp] with an example: Slavery. Slavery was once held as a decent practice through a system of ill-informed beliefs. Clearly, we have learned from this mistake, but how? Using theoretical beliefs that are about “what should be”. As we discover new facts about people and their desires, we hold new beliefs. We should use those beliefs formulated from facts about the world to create new practices. The view expressed in this quote leaves us helpless in evaluating whether anything has been good(historically, culturally, presently) or bad ( historically, culturally, presently), right or wrong, and the rest of it. In a sense, the view may go so far as to condone certain acts that are being perpetrated against humanity because it is okay, given that it fits the world in which we live more accurately. We shouldn’t strive for “what should be”, instead we should embrace what is.
I apologize for the length of this post. Responses are welcome. This is fun.
Yes, it is fun. And I am mostly out of my element, having not either been present for the conversation or becuase I'm woefully behind in my philosophy. But I feel compelled to jump in, so know that I will fumble.
Cullen, what I was saying (poorly and confusingly) was more about the process of coming up with an ethical theory. That the tools we use to develop theories (logic, rationality, laws of cause & effect, etc.) should mirror our world. I was taking "linearily" to mean something very conservative and straightforward (i.e. a theory that does not take into account sociological, psychological, economic, etc. factors that would come into play when an ethical decision needed to be made). A very simple example would be a moral theory handed down to us by someone or something else, for example the commandments in the Bible. There is no obvious appeal to logic and rationality here really, rather there is a mindlessness and a rejection of some of our qualities like free will and responsibility, etc.
I also intended to say with the "what should be" remark that a moral theory that disregards the actual daily factors of the situation, that instead supposes the situation is ideal in some way, is unfair and ultimately pointless. Let me try this. If someone were to convince me that being a prostitute is unethical, their argument must take into account economic inequality and social factors like gender or age or race or sexual preference discrimination, etc. I would not be convinced by an argument that said something "linear" (as I took it to mean) like "it's wrong because it can hurt people." In an ideal world, a world of "what should be," maybe that idea could hold water, but I feel it's more complicated than that.
Something like this?
Maybe, I too, didn't quite understand the word "linear" either. And so simplified things a bit too much.
For the record, I don't condone hurting anyone but one's self. Well, I'll make an exception for family.
Yes I did mean something like what Cullen meant for linearity, though I keep getting confused about the uses of supervenience. That was part of my oversimplification. Sorry to so dunderheadedly represent your case & I'm glad you straightened me out, though now I'm not sure where our disagreement lies. I've been thinking, however, about the efficacy of the use of examples in attempting to define the morality or immorality of an action (I'm not going to get into fantasies here, which I still think cannot be deemed immoral).
I'm not opposed to the use of examples on principle, I mean I'm a poet--I love metaphor, which is in essence a kind of skewed examplary mode of thinking. But in a relational approach to ethics I don't think that any example can provide a definition for another situation. Not only because of the fluctuation of facts that define the particular situation (though I doubt your particularist stance would agree with examples-are useless) but because a set theory seems to allow for only a perfected or perhaps idealized group of members, which becomes a linguistic model. The relationship between a prostitute and the set Prostitutes seems at best linguistic. I don't see how one can say that x defines P morally and therefore defines p when the relationship between p1 and p2 could be different in every way except that they share one characteristic. Can modal logic appeal to the world from real-world examples up in any way or is this a fundamental difference between them & the Continentals?
And I think your interpretation of Sommer's idea perhaps points out some problems with how she defined it, but it seems that what she meant was not that an ethics should be defined statically by what is, but by understanding what decisions people make and why they make them.
Which seems to imply that she thinks (As I guess I'm leaning toward as well) modal logic does not do this or that modal logic is a system too abstracted in its functioning to be able to define everyday morality ina way that is not prescriptive. I have a feeling you disagree wildly. Or that I'm acting the naif here.
what's modal logic? the usual way one thinks of logic?
Sommer. I hope it did not seem like I thought you, as a person, would condone such actions. The sentence seemed incriminating and I should hope, assuming you are fully rational, would not want harm to others, or even yourself. As you can see, my view does not disregard these facts: it welcomes them. Even with a view such as mine, it seems as if prostitution would still be impermissible given all of the facts about the world, this world [modality aside]. I won’t go into a defense today.
I think you are right in pointing out that ethical theories, such as those grounded in the Bible, do not appeal to logic and rationality. It is what it is, without evidence; which is something philosophers avoid. I do not think that most “linear” ethical theories avoid logic and rationality. In fact, I think they embrace it. Theories such as Utilitarianism, seem linear, but still have logical commitments and a rationality requirement. It has evidence, at least grounded in decision-making. Utilitarianism arguably shows how people make choices [i.e. acting to maximize pleasure for the greatest number of people] given that rational humans tend to avoid pain.
Mathias brings up a further worry about the use of examples. I take it that you are worried about using examples as proof, which seems too charitable a position for examples to be in. I think you are right to question this methodology. I question it myself. I only use examples to set the stage, or at least I hope I do, for application of my theory of reasons. I show that I get it right, just as well as other theories will, and even better in difficult circumstances because I take seriously the facts of the event. It would seem rather shallow to hope that my arguments from example are proving anything at all. I envision my use of example as telling a story of a moral incident, not as evidence.
On to Modal logic. Modal logic concerns itself with necessity and possibility [(Necessarily) Water is H20, “Today, Cullen is wearing a blue shirt”(this is possible, since it is contingent to our world. I could have worn a green colored shirt)]. When modality is used in ethical talk, it talks of possible states of affairs, or counterfactuals, to talk about the types of action available to an agent in a situation [i.e. Had I known it was going to rain, I would have brought my umbrella].
Typically, when we speak counterfactually, these possible states of affairs take place in possible worlds. Possible worlds are those worlds in which the actions you don’t do in the actual world are carried out [If you are a Lewisian, which I consider myself an armchair Lewisian, these possible worlds actually exist]. These possible worlds branch off from the actual world. They are not different worlds in other dimensions, or like the planet Jupiter, but something like doppelgangers carrying out all other possibilia. Since they branch from the actual world, all physical laws hold, you are you because you couldn’t be anyone else [events may differ, but you are still you doing those things], yet your name may be different [this claim is controversial. I happen to think names are contingent, but I’m in a small minority these days].
Supervenience is a modal claim, but I’m not sure it has much to do with my argument. Modality does play a role when discussing error in perceiving the right thing to do in context. I think this is where counterfactuals play a large role in our moral thought. Had someone had seen a certain non-moral feature of the case; they would have acted differently. It is possible for me to perceive that non-moral fact. I failed, and someone can point that out to me. Once that is done, it allows for moral education, meaning I will [fingers crossed] not miss that feature if it appears for evaluation in the next event.
I hope this helps with some of this. I did not put in as much care with this post as the last one. I’m sure you have more questions than answers.
Hot Dogs rule.
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